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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory
opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.' By
unanimity it decided that (1) neither in customary law nor in conventional
international law, is there any specific authorization to threaten or to use
nuclear weapons, (2) a threat or use of nuclear weapons contrary to Article
2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter is unlawful, (3) a threat or use of nuclear
weapons must be compatible with the requirements of the international law
applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of
international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under
treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons
and (4) states are obliged to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.2 By eleven votes to three, the
Court found neither in customary nor in conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such.3 Finally, and this is the most controversial aspect of the
opinion, by seven votes to seven and with a casting vote of the President, the
Court held that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.4 However, in view
of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.5
II. COMPETENCE OF THE COURT
A. General Remarks
The competence of the Court6 to give advisory opinions to, in casu, the
General Assembly is regulated by Article 96(1) of the United Nations
'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 265-67 (Advisory
Opinion of July 8) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809.
2 See id. at 266.
3 Id. at 266.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 The word competence is used here according to Rosenne's definition meaning both
jurisdiction and propriety. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
253 (1957).
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Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
These articles provide that the Court may issue an advisory opinion on any
legal question when it is requested to do so by the General Assembly.7
Before replying to the question, the Court will have to assure itself that it is
competent.8 This involves investigating its jurisdiction and examining the
propriety of entertaining the request. The jurisdiction of the Court depends
on whether the requesting organ (i.e. the General Assembly) has followed the
correct procedure and is not acting ultra vires. Also part of the jurisdictional
aspect is an assessment on whether the question is a legal question. Finally,
the Court will have to decide whether it would be proper to give a reply.9
B. Jurisdiction of the General Assembly to Request an Advisory Opinion
Article 96(1) of the United Nations Charter declares that the General
Assembly can request advisory opinions on any legal question. Article 96(2)
limits the possibility of requesting an advisory opinion for authorized
organizations to matters which are within the scope of their activity. A strict
a contrario interpretation leads to the conclusion that no such limitation
exists for the organs deriving their jurisdiction from Article 96(1). It has,
however, rightly been pointed out that this limitation is undoubtedly implied
in Article 96(1).'° The reason simply being that international organizations
only have the powers attributed to them by states." It cannot be the aim
of Article 96(1) to allow the General Assembly to request advice on matters
for which it would otherwise not be competent.
2
7 See generally, P. Daillier, Article 96, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 1283-98 (J.-P.
Cot & A. Pellet eds., 1985).
8 See KENNETH JAMES KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 35 (1971). The jurisdiction of a court to determine its
own jurisdiction is called 'comp6tence de la compdtence.' See also DHARMA PRATAP, THE
ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 117-19 (1972); IBRAHIM SHIHATA,
THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN JURISDICTION:
COMPtTENCE DE LA COMPeTENCE 400 (1995).
9 See KEITH, supra note 8, at 35.
'0 Hermann Mosler, Article 96, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMEN-
TARY 1008, 1010-11 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
" H.G. SCHERMERS & N.M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW § 209
(1995).
'2 Martin Lailach, The General Assembly's Request for an Advisory Opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the Leqality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 401, 423 (1995).
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Whereas the Court found that there is a presumption that an action by the
United Nations is not ultra vires if it is an appropriate fulfillment of the
stated principles of the United Nations. 3  Ultra vires decisions of organs
within the U.N. are more readily found.' 4 It was suggested that this matter
was within the powers of the Security Council rather than of the General
Assembly.' 5 The Court has shown that the General Assembly is competent
based on Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the United Nations Charter. 6 In
essence, these articles give the General Assembly the power to conduct
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of the progressive
development of international law on any question within the scope of the
Charter and especially concerning the maintenance of peace and security,
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments. Although Article 12 declares that the functions of the General
Assembly are subordinate to those of the Security Council, 7 this does not
pose a problem for Article 11(1) because there is a clear functional division:
the General Assembly considers general principles and the Security Council
makes concrete plans.18
The requesting body does not only have to act within its jurisdiction but
also according to the procedural requirements pertinent to that body. In his
dissenting opinion Judge Oda was opposed to the request of the General
Assembly because it was decided without "a meaningful consensus."' 9 Yet
there is no procedural rule requiring a meaningful consensus. It is estab-
lished practice that a decision on a request for an advisory opinion is taken
with a simple majority.20 Similarly, one commentator rejects the idea that
a 2/3 majority might be required because it is not an important question
within the meaning of Article 18(2) of the United Nations Charter.2 In
fact, it is neither listed in Article 18(2), nor did the General Assembly itself
"3 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Advisory Opinion
of July 20).
14 See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 11, at § 208.
" See Lailach, supra note 12, at 424.
16 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 233-34.
"See Lailach, supra note 12, at 424.
"Id. See also Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Article 11, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 10, at 242, 244-45.
'9 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 332 (dissenting
opinion of Judge' Oda).
'o Mosler, supra note 10, at 1011.
21 Lailach, supra note 12, at 428.
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consider it an important question.22
Thus the Court correctly decided that the General Assembly acted within
its jurisdiction irrespective of the interpretation of Article 96(1). Further-
more, the decision was made in accordance with the procedural requirements.
C. A Legal Question
The Court can only render advisory opinions on legal questions and cannot
render advisory opinions on political questions.2 3  Opponents of the
advisory opinion vigorously argued that the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons is essentially a political question.
The issue was consistently debated in the First Committee, the General
Assembly and before the Court.24 The debate consisted of two intercon-
necting elements. First, the opponents considered the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons a practical question that was appropriately handled
through negotiations.2- An advisory opinion would arguably only harden
each party in its position and would hamper the negotiating process.26
Second, opponents argued that the motives for requesting the advisory
opinions were purely political. The Court's acceptance of the question
arguably would leave it open to political pressure and would prejudice its
judicial reputation.28
1. Legal or Political?
The Court and scholars have clarified the meaning of "legal question" for
purposes of Article 96.29 Questions which have political aspects, a political
22 id.
z Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 16, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055.
24 For an account of the proceedings in the First Committee and the General Assembly,
see Lailach, supra note 12, at 401-19.
Id. at 404.
26 These arguments were forwarded by Morocco, Russian Federation, France, United
Kingdom, Benin, Canada, Sweden, Australia and Malta during the debates in the First
Committee. Id.
2 Id.
28 See generally, Lailach, supra note 12, at 406-15, 419-23 (giving an account of the
debate in the General Assembly).
29 See, e.g., PRATAP, supra note 8, at 90-91; ROSENNE, supra note 6, at 454-59; Mosler,
supra note 10, at 1013-15.
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background, or are part of a legal dispute pending before the representing
organ could constitute legal questions.30 If this were not the case, scarcely
any question would be left. The Court has recognized that virtually all
international law questions have political aspects.3 One commentator
pointed out that most international disputes have legal foregrounds and
political backgrounds.32
For the Court, it suffices that a question is framed in terms of law and
raises problems of international law.33 Such question appears, according to
the Court, to bea question of a legal character if it is susceptible to a reply
based on law.34
As to the problem of concurrent competency of both the General
Assembly and the ICJ, the Court pointed out that "in situations in which
political considerations are prominent it may be particularly necessary for an
international organization to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to
the legal principles applicable with respect to the matter under debate. 35
This attitude of the Court has been applauded by legal scholars. Their praise
mainly focuses on the fact that this allows the Court to depoliticize debates
or make political debates justiciable.36
2. Motives and implications
To convince the Court that the legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons
was a political question, the opponents next argued that the supporters of the
request were purely driven by political motives and that issuance of an
advisory opinion would have political implications. Opponents argued that
supporters would use the reply of the Court in their political struggle for the
30 See generally, KEITH, supra note 8, at 50-87 (presenting a detailed discussion of the
"legal question" requirement).
31 See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 234.
32 M. 0. HUDSON, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND THE PERMANENT COURT 374 (1972).
33 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 233-34
(quoting Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 18). Note that the opponents argued
that it was a political question framed in legal terms. See Lailach, supra note 12, at 404.
' See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 234.
3' Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 234 (quoting
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory
Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 87).
' See ROSENNE, supra note 6, at 60.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.37 The Court made it clear in
the first Admissions case that it would not consider the reasons for requesting
an advisory opinion. 38  The UN Charter provides: "[The Court] is not
concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request, nor with
the considerations which ... formed the subject of the exchange of views
which took place in that body. 39
In the case regarding the legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, the
Court held to this view and rejected all arguments based on motives which
may have inspired the request and potential political implications of the
opinion.
3. Judicial Propriety
Once the Court established its jurisdiction, it turned to the second element
of competence. The jurisdiction of the Court is discretionary according to
Article 65(1) of the Statute' but the Court, as the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations, will not refuse to render an opinion unless there are
compelling reasons.4" The present Court has never refused to answer a
question. However, precedent of refusal to answer a question can be found
in the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, namely
in the Eastern Carelia case.42
In the nuclear weapons case, the Court rejected all of the suggested
reasons for refusing to give an Advisory Opinion as uncompelling.43
Reasons the Court rejected included: the vague and abstract nature of the
question, the General Assembly's failure to explain its purpose in seeking an
advisory opinion, the possibility that the advisory opinion might adversely
affect the disarmament process, and the possibility that the Court would go
beyond its judicial role into a legislative one.'
" See Lailach, supra note 12, at 420.
38 Id.
39 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of
the UN Charter), 1948 ICJ 61 (Advisory Opinion of May 28).
o Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 23, at 1055.
41 See Mosler, supra note 10, at 1013. For a list of cases in which the Court discussed
its decisions regarding Advisory Opinions, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 1, at 234. For further discussion see Said Mahmoudi, The International
Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 66 NoRDIC J. INT'L. L. 77, 81-82 (1997).
42 See Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No 5 (July 23). The reason for
the refusal in this case was the absence of consent of one state in an inter-state conflict.
43 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 236-37.
"Id.
[Vol. 27:345
THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Nature of the Question
It is for the Court irrelevant whether a question is hypothetical, abstract or
concrete.45 Although some diverging views have existed, it is now clear
that the Court can entertain both abstract and concrete questions.46
The General Assembly's Unexplained Purpose in Requesting an Advisory
Opinion
Some states argued that the General Assembly did not explain the reasons
it sought an advisory opinion.47 The Court answered this argument by
holding that it would not have regard for the origins or the political history
of the request, or the distribution of votes with respect to the adopted
resolution."a
The Effect on the Disarmament Process
The Court did not account for the effect of the advisory opinion on the
disarmament process because it lacked criteria to assess its effect on
disarmament negotiations.49
The Court's Judicial Role
If the corpus juris could not provide rules to deal with the question at hand
then the Court would be required to go beyond its judicial role. The Court
was confident that it could render a reply by applying existing rules,
although the need might arise to specify the scope of the law or to note its
general trend.50  However, after a survey of relevant customary and
conventional international law, the Court effectively left an important
question unanswered. The Court held that although there was nothing within
45 See PRATAP, supra note 8, at 130.
4' See id. at 169-72; see also ROSENNE, supra note 6, at 466-68. But see KEITH, supra
note 8, at 62-74 (arguing that the Court's role is to settle actual disputes and without actual
facts it may be impossible to properly answer the question put to it without redrafting it).
The accusation that the question is vague refers to the requirement in Article 65(2) of the
Statute that questions submitted for advisory opinions be laid out in an exact statement of the
question. Some may argue that the "exactness" requires a precise and exact question but it
is generally accepted that the question submitted must faithfully reflect the question asked by
the requesting organ. See KEITH, supra note 8, at 72.
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customary or conventional international law that specifically authorized the
use or threat of nuclear weapons, neither was there a comprehensive and
universal prohibition of the use or threat of nuclear weapons.5' There is
merit to the argument of Judge Higgins who finds this inconsistent with the
Court's decision that it could render a reply using existing international
law.52
III. THE REQUEST SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
The General Assembly submitted the following question to the Internation-
al Court of Justice:
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances
permitted under international law? (Est-il permis en droit international
de recourir A la menace ou A l'emploi d'armes nucl6aire en toute
circonstance?)53
A. The Absurdity of the Question
The question, following the English version, invites the Court to determine
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is ever permitted.55 The
Court could answer the question in the affirmative and be done with it.5
6
Obviously, this was not the result envisaged by the supporters of the request.
As Judge Oda pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the supporters of the
request phrased the question in this way because they wanted the Court to
"' id. at 253.
52 Id. at 583 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins). For an opposing view, see id. at 280
(declaration of Judge Vereshchetin).
53 See G.A. Res. 75, 49th Sess., 90th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/49I5 (1995).
54 Judge Ranjeva speaks of "le caractare evident ou absurde de la question." Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 298 (separate opinion of Judge
Ranjeva).
5' The English translation read, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law?" Id. at 238.
- Id. at 237. An interesting criticism to this approach came from a delegate from
Australia, Mr. Gareth Evans: "it would be academic and unreal for any analysis to seek to
demonstrate that the use of a single nuclear weapon in particular circumstances could be
consistent with the principle of humanity. The reality is that if nuclear weapons ever were
used, this would be overwhelmingly likely trigger a nuclear war." Id. at 547-59 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry). See also Lailach, supra note 12, at 422.
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answer: "No, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is not permitted under
international law in any circumstances."57  According to Judge Oda they
were seeking the endorsement of a legal axiom.5"
The French version of the question invites the Court to look for an
example where recourse to nuclear weapons is illegal and proceed with a
negative reply.59
The Court did not reply to the question as submitted but distilled what it
considered the real objective. Although the Court is bound to the question
submitted, it is also the duty of the Court to "ascertain what are the legal
questions really in questions formulated in a request." 6 This duty is based
on its responsibility to contribute to the good functioning of the international
organizations and to be able to give a reply that is both useful and conform-
ing to the judicial role of the Court.61
The redrafted question entertained by the Court was: "is the threat or use
of nuclear weapons legal or illegal in any circumstances?'62  In other
words, the Court was going to apply the body of international law to the
threat or use of nuclear weapons to determine whether such behavior is legal
or illegal.
B. The Threat or Use
In the request submitted, the disjunctive word "or" creates two possibili-
ties: the threat of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear weapons. What
is meant by "use" is clear, the meaning of "threat" in this context is less
apparent. The phrase "threat of nuclear weapons" does not necessarily imply
"use" of nuclear weapons. The possession can be perceived as threatening
through the production, stockpiling or targeting of nuclear weapons.63
5' Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 333 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Oda).
58 id.
59 The divergence between the English and the French text will not be looked at further
since neither the Court, nor Judge Oda (the only judge dissenting on this point), nor the
French-speaking delegations in the First Committee and the General Assembly raised
objections and the original draft was submitted in English in the First Committee (by
Indonesia). See id. at 238, 333; Lailach, supra note 12, at 401-02.
60 MOSLER, supra note 10, at 1014. See also KEITH, supra note 8, at 64-65.
61 See Daillier, supra note 7, at 1288-89.
62 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 237.
63 Id. at 540 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry). Judge Weeramantry
distinguishes threat from possession or stockpiling. Threat, according to him, is possession
of weapons in a state of readiness for actual use. See id.
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This interpretation was not followed by the Court. On the contrary, the
Court considered the phrase to mean: the threat or use of force (employing
nuclear weapons). "Threat" in this view becomes an actual threat to use
such force as opposed to actions which could be perceived as a threat to use
force.(4 This interpretation is directly based on Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter.65 The "threat" and "use" are, in this interpretation, inextricably
linked; if the use of force is illegal, the threat to use such force is equally
illegal.' Mere possession of nuclear weapons might justify an inference
of preparedness to use them; however, to constitute a threat, there must be
a credible intention to use them in certain circumstances. 67 Although this
is probably what was meant by Indonesia when the original draft resolution
was proposed in the First Committee, it seems that some countries supported
the draft resolution on the basis of the alternate interpretation. 
6
C. Permitted or Prohibited?
The use of the word "permitted" begs the question whether a state needs
permission to do anything. Under the classical theory of international law
the principles of sovereignty and consent make a state free to do anything
it wishes, unless it has consented to limit its sovereignty. 69 Limitations on
6 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 243, 246.
See also M.J. Zarif et al., Impermissibility of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons:
A case for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice, VIII IRANIAN J. INT'L
AFF. 1 (1996). Note that a similar line is followed in the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties
which prohibit the use or threat to use nuclear weapons. See Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281
[hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]; The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1440 [hereinafter Treaty of Rarotonga].
6 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 246.
6 See id. But see R. Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM, J. INT'L L. 237, 250 (1988)
(stating that "there is no reason to assume that the threat will always be unlawful if in the
same circumstances the resort to force would be illicit"). See also William R. Hearn, The
International Legal Regime Regulating Nuclear Deterrence and Warfare, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 199, 209 (1990).
"7 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 540 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
' See Lailach, supra note 12, at 401-19. This was rightly underlined by Oda in his
dissenting opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at
333 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda).
' This stance on international law is reflected in military handbooks. These handbooks
state that in the absence of a specific prohibition the use of nuclear weapons is permissible
under international law. Several military handbooks are quoted by Hearn, supra note 66, at
[Vol. 27:345
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sovereignty are not presumed. The theory of residual rights resting with
states was confirmed in the Lotus case.70  This principle applied to the
question of legality of nuclear weapons would presumably give states a right
to use nuclear weapons, unless prohibited under international law. But
surely the Lotus principle cannot give states the right to extinguish
civilizations, annihilate mankind and destroy the framework of the interna-
tional community.7'
In our view, the Lotus principle should not have been applied to this case.
The Lotus case involved a different set of circumstances and its applicability
should be limited to cases involving similar circumstances. First, Lotus
involved a peace-time accident. There is a peace-time rule of customary
international law imposing a duty on states to conduct their affairs so as not
to injure others.72 Second, the theory of state sovereignty is presently
viewed in a different perspective. We no longer live in an international
society consisting of "co-existing independent communities ' '73 but in an
increasingly interconnected global world. The different circumstances and
the changed attitude toward sovereignty undoubtedly make this case
distinguishable.74 Some commentators erroneously argued that in the
nuclear weapons advisory opinion, the Court followed the Lotus dictum.
This argument was based on § 52 of the advisory opinion, where the Court
stated that "state practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain
weapons as such does not result from an absence of authorization but, on the
contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition. 75 However, this is merely
an observation of reality, rather than a confirmation of the Lotus principle.
Even if the Lotus case were applied, quod non, the states possessing
nuclear weapons have accepted that they are bound by humanitarian
principles and by the Hague Convention.76
222-23; see also Richard Falk et al., Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 20 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 558 (1980).
70 S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sep. 7).
"' Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 395 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
72 Id. at 496 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
73 Id. at 394 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
14 Id. at 396 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); see also id. at 494-95
(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
I ld. at 246.
76 Id. at 239; see also id. at 495 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramnantry); A.-S. Millet,
Les Avis Consultatifs de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 8 Juillet 1996; Licdite de
l'utilisation des armes nucldaires par un Etat dans un conflit arm. Licifitd de la menace ou
1999]
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Only if the Lotus case were applied, would the use of the word "prohibit-
ed" be more in line with the theory of international law. The position of the
Court is unclear, however. The attitude taken has made the debate rather
academic since the redrafted question incorporates both the positive and the
negative approach to the problem.77 The Court investigates both prohibi-
tions and authorizations in international law.78
D. Nuclear Weapons
Although the request for the advisory opinion was primarily aimed at
nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction, the Court held it could not
differentiate between various kinds of nuclear weapons.79 As a result, the
advisory opinion would encompass all nuclear weapons. Some states had
suggested that the so-called clean use of smaller, low-yield, tactical or
battlefield nuclear weapons could be permissible."0 Suggested targets were
a lone nuclear submarine or an isolated military target in the desert.8" This
de l'emploi d'armes nucliaires, 1 REVUE GNIRALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 162-
163 (1997). Millet points at the ambiguity existing in the advisory opinion. The Court takes
no clear position but investigates both prohibitions and authorizations which is contrary to the
Lotus principle. The same ambiguity is found in the declarations and opinions of the judges.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon, supra note 1, at 268, 274 (declaration
of President Bedjaoui), 287-93 (separate opinion of Judge Guillaume).
' The following rule from the Nicaragua case was also relied upon: "In International law
there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty
or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited." Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, at 135 (June 27). This deals with
mere possession and is thus irrelevant, considering the construction of the question by the
Court. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 239,
245-46. But see J.H. McNeill, The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion in the
Nuclear Weapons Cases: A First Appraisal, INT'L REV. RED CROSS 107-08 (1997) (arguing
that the Court only evaluates whether the threat or use is prohibited).
78 See supra pp. 355-356.
79 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 262.
go See id.
81 Other words used to describe these weapons are theater, clean, and tactical. See
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 381 (dissenting opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen). More examples can be found in Falk et al., supra note 69, at 561.
It would be "possible to imagine 'surgical' minimal uses of nuclear weapons that achieve
their military objectives with no greater level of destruction and suffering than their pre-
nuclear antecedents, but such potential uses (e.g. in a mountain pass or to destroy an
approaching fleet) are not characteristic of the broader, less discriminate, role accorded to
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seems to be an illogical suggestion, because nuclear weapons would still
have the effect of creating consequences far greater than the actual blast even
if smaller weapons are used. As Judge Weeramantry writes, it would not
render biological or chemical weapons lawful if they were applied in small
quantities.8 2 Moreover, there still remains a real risk of escalation when
tactical nuclear weapons are used.83  As pointed out by UN experts, it
might prove very difficult for the side under attack to know whether they are
being attacked with tactical weapons or with strategic weapons.' The side
under attack would have to make decisions having no knowledge concerning
the exact weapons used in the attack and the effects of such weapons. The
communication lines would likely be cut in such an attack limiting the ability
of the side under attack to acquire such knowledge. Thus, the side under
attack would likely respond in a manner inconsistent with the principles of
necessity and proportionality.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES APPLICABLE TO THE LEGALITY OF
THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Court, in its search for the identification of the existing principles and
rules that may be applicable to the request for an advisory opinion on the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, conducted a three-part
analysis. First, it considered general rules and principles; then it examined
the UN Charter; and, finally, it focused on the law applicable in armed
conflict situations.
nuclear weapons in various strategic outlooks." Id. at 561. An alternative classification can
be found in Peter Weiss et al., Draft Memorial in Support of the Application by the World
Health Organization for an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, Including the WH.O.
Constitution, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 721, 783 (1994). They speak in terms
of micro nukes, mini nukes and tiny nukes.
82 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 548-49 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
83 See Falk et al., supra note 69, at 544.
4 See SIDNEY D. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 148 (1972). For a
discussion on various restrictions on weapons, see generally INGRID DETrER DE LuPiS, THE
LAW OF WAR (1987).
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A. Conventional Rules of General Scope
Although the following areas of international law do not specifically
regulate the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court found them relevant
to its inquiry: human rights law, the rules on the prohibition of genocide,
and environmental law.85 However, the Court focused on the law applica-
ble in armed conflicts.
First the Court delved into human rights law, particularly Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights referring to the right of
life. 6 The Court correctly stated that the protection of human rights does
not cease in times of war." Although Article 4 of the Covenant limits
certain human rights in times of national emergency, the right to life is non-
derogable.88  Under no circumstances should a person be arbitrarily
deprived of his life. To determine whether someone has been arbitrarily
deprived of life, the Court found that the law applicable in armed conflicts
should be consulted.89 The Court's finding, however, is not free from
criticism. Not all references to the right of life in international law are
qualified by the term "arbitrarily." 9 Moreover, it has been suggested that
the term "arbitrarily" is synonymous with the phrase "without due process
of law,"9' and does not refer to the applicable law of armed conflict, as the
' See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 239-41.
86 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 174. Article 6 is worded as follows: "Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life." i.
' See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 240.
g' See iai
" See iii The Court stated that "whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a
certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to
Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed
conflict and not deduced from the term of the Covenant itself." Id.
o For example, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, widely
recognized as declaratory of customary international law, holds that "everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217, 2 GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1777, art. 3 (1948).
91 See B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimension of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT
TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 19 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985). Ramcharan writes that
the word 'arbitrary' was one of the most extensively debated terms in the Universal
Declaration and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. From this debate
he concludes that the intention of the drafters was to provide the highest possible level of
protection of the right to life and to confine permissible deprivations therefrom to the
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Court believed. Even the Human Rights Committee (HRC) seems to adopt
an interpretation different from that of the Court. It is quite significant that
the HRC stated that the right of life "is the supreme right from which no
derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation.92  The HRC thus provides an answer to resolve the
Court's dilemma. The HRC has even demonstrated its concern about the
right to life in the context of weapons of mass destruction:
3. While remaining deeply concerned by the toll of human life taken
by conventional weapons in armed conflicts, the Committee has noted
that, during successive sessions of the General Assembly, representa-
tives from all geographical regions have expressed their growing
concern at the development and proliferation of increasingly awesome
weapons of mass destruction, which not only threaten human life but
also absorb resources that could otherwise be used for vital economic
and social purposes, particularly for the benefit of developing
countries, and thereby for promoting and securing the enjoyment of
human rights for all.
4. The Committee associates itself with this concern. It is evident
that the designing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment
of nuclear weapons are among the greatest threats to the right to life
which confront mankind today. This threat is compounded by the
danger that the actual use of such weapons may be brought about, not
only in the event of war, but even through human or mechanical error
or failure.
5. Furthermore, the very existence and gravity of this threat
generates a climate of suspicion and fear between States, which is
itself antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance
narrowest of limits. Therefore, he opines, certain considerations should be taken into account
in order to grasp the proper understanding of the concept of arbitrariness. For further
discussion see id. at 19-20.
92 General Comment No. 14, Article 6 (Twenty-third session, 1984), U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1 (1992), at 17 [hereinafter General Comment]. Compare the core of the opinion
where the Court stated that "in the view of the present state of international law.. ., and of
the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court [cannot conclude definitively whether the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful] in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in
which [a State's] very survival would be at stake." (Emphasis added.) Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 263.
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with the Charter of the United Nations and the International Cove-
nants on Human Rights.
6. The production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear
weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against
humanity.
7. The Committee accordingly, in the interest of mankind, calls upon
all States, whether Parties to the Covenant or not, to take urgent
steps, unilaterally and by agreement, to rid the world of this men-
ace.
93
Several other human rights, not referred to by the Court, are susceptible to
violation by the use of nuclear weapons. Such rights include: the right to
be free from torture, the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,94 and the right to health. 95
By referring solely to the law applicable in armed conflict as the Court
did, the Court did not address other relevant aspects of the issue. For
example, a state could use a nuclear weapon against its own population. In
such a situation the rules applicable in armed conflict would not apply. On
that point, the Court stated that it was "not called upon to deal with an
internal use of nuclear weapons" because no state addressed that issue during
the proceedings. 96 The question of the General Assembly, however, clearly
included such a possibility: "is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstances permitted under international law?" As a result, the Court
should have answered that question too. The Court also failed to answer the
question of whether the testing of nuclear weapons can be considered "use"
of such weapons.97
" General Comment, supra note 92, at 17.
94 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 90, at art. 5; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175.
9' See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 90, at art. 25;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 12, para.
1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8.
9 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 247.
9 There has been a development in international law prohibiting certain forms of nuclear
testing. See, e.g., Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402
U.N.T.S. 72; Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 64; Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons-free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635; African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty, opened for signature June 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 698; Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note
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The Court agreed with the suggestion made by some states that the use of
nuclear weapons could be contrary to both the rules of customary law
prohibiting genocide and the conventional rules of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." However, the
intent element of the Genocide Convention necessitates an examination of
the specific circumstances of each case and precludes its use as a generally
applicable rule regarding the use of nuclear weapons.99
The Court also examined international environmental law and concluded
that the existing corpus of international environmental law cannot be used
to deprive a state of its inherent right to self-defense. Environmental
considerations must, however, be taken into consideration "when assessing
what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military
objectives."'" Just as it had done when examining the issue under human
rights law, the Court focused primarily on the law applicable in armed
conflict and thereby failed to consider several relevant instruments of
environmental law. Examples include the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea,'' the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection
64; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,610 U.N.T.S 206,
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature September 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439.
" Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
99 Article II defines genocide as:
[Alny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Id. at 281.
100 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 242.
'0' United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245.
Article 192 requires that:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other
States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they
exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention. Id. at 1308.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of the Ozone Layer,0 2 the Framework Convention on Climate Change,10 3
the Convention on Biological Diversity,1°4 and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. 5 The Court based its argument on
Articles 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions."
"Taken together," the Court argued, "these provisions embody a general
obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term
and severe environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage; and
the prohibition of attacks against the natural environment by way of repri-
sal."' 07 By focusing only on the rights applicable in armed conflict, the
Court overlooked aspects of the question posed by the General Assembly,
namely whether the use of nuclear weapons in times of peace would violate
environmental law.
"0 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M.
1516. Article 2(1) states: "The Parties shall take appropriate measures... to protect human
health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer." Id. at 1529.
03 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849. Article 3 states:
In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its
provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof. Id. at 854.
'04 Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818. Article 3 states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
'0 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Jan.'14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874. The
declaration requires that, "States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem." Id. at 877. At
Principle 25 it states, "Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent
and indivisible." Id. at 880.
'0 Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
" Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 242.
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In sum, the Court's reasoning demonstrates its intention to discuss whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would violate the rules applicable in
armed conflict. It only superficially considered the general conventional
rules of environmental and humanitarian law without drawing the proper
conclusions of these bodies of law. Although the Court did not state
explicitly that the threat or use of nuclear weapons outside the domain of
armed conflict is contrary to international law, one might reach such a
conclusion in construing the opinion. In fact, the Court limited its advisory
opinion to the facts of the case before it rather than issuing a general
statement regarding the legality or use of nuclear weapons in every
circumstance. 108
B. The Charter
1. Prohibition of the Use of Force
A state's recourse to use of force has been long considered an acceptable
option, but only in limited circumstances. Civilized societies took an amoral
approach only in rare cases.1' 9 Even ancient civilizations such as those in
India and China had rules justifying war."' International relations in the
western world were, from the Roman era until modern times, dominated by
the theory of the bellum justum.I ' The theory was adopted by the Chris-
tians and, by the beginning of modern international law in the 17th century,
had evolved into a theory of bellum legale."2
This evolution can be seen in treaty law, which has gradually curtailed a
state's right to go to war.' The real turning point was the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928."' Until 1928, war was considered a valid option unless
08 Id. at 234-38.
"0 The secular authority of Russia and Byzantium in the eleventh and twelfth centuries
took an especially amoral stance. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 5-6 (1991).
110 See BROWNLIE, supra note 109, at 3; BAILEY, supra note 84, at 1-53.
". The concept originated with jus fetiale. See YORAM DINSrEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENCE 61-62 (1988).
112 Josef L. Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 528-32 (1951).
"13 See Convention (II) with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899; Convention (IV) with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907
League of Nations Covenant (1919) [hereinafter Convention (IV)].
114 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. See also
BROWNLIE, supra note 109, at 74-92.
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proved unjust or waged for illegitimate purposes. The stance after 1928 was
that war is illegal and may only be resorted to in exceptional circumstanc-
es." 5 This principle inspired the United Nations Charter."6
The principle of the United Nations Charter is clear. The threat or use of
force is prohibited if it is directed against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or if it is in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations."
7
The Court indicates the two exceptions to this principle of Article 2(4),
namely Article 51 and 42."' s Article 51 concerns the inherent right to
individual or collective self-defense.' Article 42 gives the Security
Council the right to take military enforcement measures in conformity with
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 2 '
The Court does not investigate the question that might arise from an
application of Chapter VII.' The main thrust of the argument of the
Court revolves around the concept of self-defense. The Advisory Opinion
on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons hinges on this
concept.
2. Self-Defense
a. Theories Relating to Self-Defense
There are two competing views of the concept of self-defense: the first,
untying it from the realms of international law and the second, placing it
firmly within the ambit of international law, even making it part of jus
"l This evolution was typified as a shift from jus ad bellum to a jus contra bel1um.
DINsTEIN, supra note 111, at 8 1. The United States and France declared that a state claiming
self-defense, nevertheless, is alone competent to decide whether circumstances require
recourse to war. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
259, 260-61 (1989). For a reaction, see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 172-80 (Archon Books 1966) (1933).
..6 DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 81-86.
1' UN Charter art. 2, para. 4. See also Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 10, at 106-28.
Is See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 245.
J See Randelzhofer, supra note 117, at 661-78; DE LUPIs, supra note 84, at 73-75.
' See Randelzhofer, supra note 117, at 661-78; Georges Fischer, Article 42, in LA
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, supra note 7, at 705-16; DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 86.
... See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 247.
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cogens.122
The first approach places the emphasis on the inherent right (droit
naturel)123 language of Article 51 of the Charter. The theory is based on
a traditional naturalist doctrine. 24 The inherent right could not be limited
by positive law as it had its origin "directly and chiefly, in the fact that
nature commits to each his own protection."' 's As such, the right was not
governed by law. It was judged by states and not susceptible to objective
legal scrutiny. 26 Dinstein describes this theory as an anachronistic residue
from an era in which international law was dominated by ecclesiastical doc-
trines. 12  Nevertheless, this naturalist fallacy still influences popular and
official attitudes in international law.
28
Within the first view, a second school of thought, equally regarding self-
defense as extra-legal, insists that self-defense cannot be governed by law
because ultimately law is subordinate to power when grave threats to the
existence of a state or its way of life are made. 29 In such cases, no legal
limits can be imposed on the sovereignty of states. 30 A clear expression
of this position can be found in the remarks of U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson before the 1963 Conference of the American Society of Internation-
al Law who pointed out that: "law does simply not deal with such questions
of ultimate power-power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty ....
The survival of states is not a matter of law." '' This theory of self-
defense is based on an older theory (19th century and beginning of the 20th
century) that claimed that war as such was extra-legal. The idea was based
on a loose analogy with phenomena of nature such as earthquakes, floods or
122 DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 98-104; Walter T. Gangl, Note, The Jus Cogens
Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 72 (1980).
123 "Droit naturel" is the term used by the French version.
124 See DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 169-72; Schachter, supra note 115, at 259-60.
'2 Schachter, supra note 115, at 259.
'26 See Schachter, supra note 115, at 261; Randelzhofer, supra note 117, at 666.
'"7DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 170.
"z See Schachter, supra note 115, at 260. See also Hearn, supra note 66, at 203-04. But
see D.K. Linnan, Self-Defence, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and
Other Views, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57-124 (1991).
"2 See Schachter, supra note 115, at 260. Hearn describes this group as political realists.
Hearn, supra note 66, at 200-02.
130 See DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 69-72, 165-72; R. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR 118
(1960).
"1' Dean Acheson, Remarks, in 1963 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 13, 14 (Washington DC).
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droughts. Like these phenomena, war was seen as an inevitable fact of life.
A fact that existed and that could be regulated by law but that could not be
"uninvented. 132 As such, a disassociation was made between the jus ad
bellum and the jus in bello. No limits could be imposed on the right of
states to wage war; their conduct during hostilities on the other hand, were
subject to regulation. 33
The theories based on the extra-legality of war and especially of self-
defense imply that recourse to the use of force can never be regulated or, a
fortiori, prohibited. At best, the regulation of the use of force itself is
accepted. In the most radical approach no limits are permitted to the use of
force in self-defense.
At first glance, the Court follows the second approach to the concept of
self-defense. In this view, self-defense is essentially a legal concept. It is
based on international customary law and is now restricted within the
confines of both the UN Charter and customary international law.'3 The
word "inherent" in this theory refers to the fact that the right is vested in all
states, not only the members of the United Nations. 35  The right is
absolute insofar as a state cannot be deprived of it but is relative because
132 See TUCKER, supra note 130, at 120.
133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 69-72. According to Judge Guillaume this reasoning
is applied by states before the Court and reflected in the present Advisory Opinion:
Tous (i.e. the states appearing) ont raisonn6 comme si ces deux types de prescription
dtaient inddpendants, en d'autres termes, comme si lejus ad bellum et lejus in bello
constituaient deux entitds n'entretenant aucun rapport l'un avec l'autre. La Cour,
dans certaines parties de son avis, a meme pu paraltre tentde par une telle
construction. Or, on peut se demander s'il en est bien ainsi ou si, au contraire, les
r~gles du jus ad bellum ne permettent pas d'6clairer celles du jus in bello.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 290 (separate opinion of
Judge Guillaume).
'34 See Randelzhofer, supra note 109, at 666. But see Linnan, supra note 128, at 57-84
(discussing the controversy over whether the Charter limited the customary right to self-
defense at the time of drafting and if so, whether this is still the case. The argument is made
that state practice might have effectively rejected the most restrictive doctrinal views of the
Charter and that it might be preferable to admit that the restricted functional customary law
rules never lost their force. This could reconcile the international law's systematic problems
with self-help and self-preservation interests).
" See id. Some say "inherent" refers to the fact that the right was pre-existing. It is not
created by the Charter but explicitly recognized by it. See L. GOODRICH ET AL., THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONs 344 (1969).
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legal rules determine its boundaries. 136 Moreover, it is not states that are
the sole judges of the applicability of the concept. 37 As stated by Hersch
Lauterpacht:
There is not the slightest relation between the content of the right to
self-defense and the claim that it is above the law and not amenable
to evaluation by law, such a claim is self-contradictory, in as much
as it purports to be based on legal right, and as, at the same time, it
dissociates itself from regulation and evaluation by the law. Like any
other dispute involving important issues, so also the question of the
right of recourse to war in self-defense is in itself capable of judicial
decision.
38
Reading only the part of the Advisory Opinion dealing with the Charter
provision leads to the conclusion that the Court gives its unfettered support
to the positivist theory of self-defense as a legal concept, limited by rules of
international law and susceptible to judicial scrutiny. However, as discussed,
infra, the Court fails to draw the only logical conclusion flowing from the
application of this theory by building a reasoning that conforms to the theory
of the contextualists1
39
b. Legal Boundaries of Self-Defense
Some boundaries are set out in Article 51 of the Charter, for example, the
time-element and notification requirement, but the most important conditions
13 See Linnan, supra note 128, at 81 (noting that self-defense was considered by the
United States as an inalienable right, inherent in every treaty); Gangl, supra note 122, at 72.
137 See Linnan, supra note 128, at 85-124.
138 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 322-23
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel) (quoting Hersch Lauterpacht); LAUTERPACHT, supra
note 115, at 180.
139 In the contextualist approach, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is not illegal as
such. The legality or illegality depends on the specific context of their threatened or actual
use. See Hearn, supra note 66, at 200-02. Even if the naturalist view is followed, this does
not mean there are no limits to the right of self-defense. Law in this context is based on
moral convictions. The destruction of mankind goes against the most fundamental moral
principles. The nuclear strategy of deterrence is described by the proponents of this
philosophy as radically inconsistent with the natural law framework. See Falk, supra note 69,
at 541-42.
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are found in international customary law. The concept of self-defense
inherently includes restrictions." In the Nicaragua case, the Court found
that "there is a specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant, only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to
respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law.''
As a result, the use of force in situations of self-deterrence must be
proportionate and necessary to respond to an armed attack.
The right of self-defense only gives a legal basis to justify the raising of
arms (jus ad bellum). Once force is resorted to, the actions taken must be
consistent with the rules of jus in bello.'42 The Court's attitude is unequiv-
ocal: "the use of force ... must, in order to be lawful, also meet the
requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.' ' 43
c. Legality or Illegality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Self-Defense
The Court concludes that nuclear weapons could be legitimately employed
under the Charter because the provisions of the Charter are not weapon-
specific. In the words of the Court "[tihe Charter neither expressly prohibits
nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons."'"
Although we agree with the conclusion reached by the Court, it is phrased
rather inappropriately because it suggests one could somehow draw
inferences from the fact that nuclear weapons are not mentioned expressis
verbis in the Charter. Today, with scientific knowledge we can assess the
nature of nuclear weapons and with the benefit of hindsight we can
appreciate the horrific consequences of the actual use of such weapons.
140 Inherent is defined as existing in someone or something as a permanent characteristic
or quality (from the Latin inhaerenslinhaerentis). See THE NEW LEXICON WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 498 (1987). "mo inhere: To exist in and
inseparable from something else;... To be inherent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 782 (6th
ed. 1991). This presumably means that these characteristics can under no circumstances be
taken from it. See also Falk, supra note 69, at 568.
"' See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 245; Military
and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, at 176 (June 27). See also
Randelzhofer, supra note 117, at 677; DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 200-21 (identifies
immediacy as a third element).
142 See DINSTEIN, supra note 111, at 200-21.
14a See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 245.
'"I d. at 244.
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However, clairvoyance is not expected from negotiators or legal draftsmen.
It is impossible to determine how the Charter would have looked had the
same knowledge and experience been available. With this reservation, we
concur with the Court that the legality or illegality of recourse to nuclear
weapons is not regulated directly by the Charter but will depend on treaties
and custom.
1 45
Since self-defense is the only legitimate basis for unilateral recourse to
force, the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons will, in the first
instance, be established on the basis of conformity with the elements of
proportionality, necessity, and the rules of jus in bello, especially the
principles and rules of humanitarian law with which the use of force in self-
defense must comply.'4
d. Unanswered Questions
The question submitted was worded in the most general terms possible,
encompassing all situations in which nuclear weapons may be used. In its
reply, the Court limited itself, disregarding aspects not argued before the
Court by states and aspects that were severable from the core argument.
Some aspects received a brief comment, such as the use of force under
Chapter VII of the Charter (collective self-defense) 47 and belligerent
reprisals.' Some were simply mentioned, such as internal wars.
14 9
Others were completely ignored in the Advisory Opinion rendered (e.g.
anticipatory self-defense"5 and responses to terrorism 51).
145 id. at 245.
1 Id.
141 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 244; id. at 276
(declaration of Judge Herczech); id. at 490-91 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry);
id. at 578 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).
14' Randelzhofer, supra note 117, at 675; DItSrEIN, supra note 111, at 230-54; Hearn,
supra note 66, at 215-20; Linnan, supra note 128, at 110-14.
141 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 249.
150 See Randelzhofer, supra note 117, at 675; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 1, at 513 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry). For an excellent
summary of the arguments on anticipatory self-defense, see Falk, supra note 69, at 210-14.
'' See Falk, supra note 69, at 571.
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C. The Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
1. Specific Rules Regulating the Legality or Illegality of Recourse to
Nuclear Weapons per se
After concluding that the Charter provisions do not provide grounds for
determining the legality or illegality of recourse to nuclear weapons, the
Court turns to other rules dealing with the legality or illegality of recourse
to nuclear weapons. First, the Court investigates whether the treaties on
poisoned weapons could apply. Second, the Court considers whether the
treaties regulating the acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and
testing of nuclear weapons have created a general prohibitive legal regime.
Third, international customary law is scrutinized in search of applicable
rules.
a. Poisoned Weapons
Conventional prohibitions on the use of poisoned weapons are found in the
Second Hague Declaration of July 29, 1899.52 Article 23(a) of the
Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land annexed to the
Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907,153 (hereinafter Regulations) and
the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925 (hereinafter Geneva Gas Protocol)."5
Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, argues for the applicability
of the Geneva Gas Protocol and Article 23(a) of the Regulations. His
reasoning is based on showing that radiation is poisonous and that it involves
contact of materials (in casu material particles) with the human body as
required by the Geneva Gas Protocol. 55 Analogous reasoning would prove
.52 Declaration Respecting Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No 32
(Cmnd. 3751), 187 Consol. T.S. 453.
15. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 289-297.
'-4 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S.
65.
155 However, material particles are a solid substance rather than a gas. Singh argues that
fissionable products could constitute a gas considering that mustard gas begins as a liquid and
is converted into a gas. See Falk, supra note 69, at 561-63. Moreover, radiation upon blast
is sometimes said to be more analogous to thermal radiation (heat), which does not involve
introducing or absorbing a damaging substance into the body. See Hearn, supra note 66, at
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the applicability of Article 23(a) of the Regulations. 5 6  This argument
draws directly on notable authorities in international law.'57 The Court,
however, does not agree with this reasoning for two reasons: one, that these
conventional instruments do not provide a definition of poisoned weapons
and so could potentially also encompass nuclear weapons, and the other, that
practice shows that states do not consider these treaties to cover nuclear
weapons.158 As a result it was held that these treaties could not be relied
upon to banish the use of nuclear weapons. 5 9
b. Treaties dealing with Nuclear Weapons expressis verbis
The trend among opponents of weapons of mass destruction is to obtain
a general prohibition against the very existence of such weapons. This goal
has been achieved with respect to chemical and biological weapons.
However, the existing treaties governing nuclear weapons do not provide a
general prohibition. Instead, existing treaties govern only certain activities
with respect to nuclear weapons, such as testing, acquisition, manufacture
and possession. The use and threat of nuclear weapons, the question under
consideration, is only prohibited in specific regions and against non-nuclear
weapon states and states who are parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation.
The states with nuclear weapons still reserve the right to use nuclear
231. 16 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 508-12
(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry). See also DETTER DE Lupis, supra note 84, at
203-04. The argument of Judge Weeramantry works better for Article 23 of the Regulations
because uranium, the central element in a nuclear weapon, is itself a highly toxic chemical.
A nuclear explosion releases a variety of toxic chemicals, including some which toxicity
endures for thousands of years. See Falk, supra note 69, at 561.
'5 See generally Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in
International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437 (1965); Eric David, The Opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 24-28 (1997); Falk, supra note 69; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958); NAGENDRA SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1989); NAGENDRA SINGH & E. MCWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTEMPO-
RARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989).
'" In fact, the practice of the United States, for example, shows that nuclear weapons are
not considered to be covered by these treaties. The United States would undoubtedly have
made a reservation to the Geneva Gas Protocol had nuclear weapons been covered. See
Hearn, supra note 66, at 230.
' See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 248.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
weapons in certain circumstances and these reservations met with no
objection from the parties to the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties or from
the Security Council.
In sum, existing treaties do not provide a general conventional prohibition
on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. As a result of the acceptance of the
Treaty of Non-Proliferation and Security Council Resolutions 255 (1968) and
984 (1995) by several non-nuclear weapon states, states who defend the
legality of recourse to nuclear weapons have inferred confirmation of the
right to possess nuclear weapons. The inferred confirmation of the right to
possess nuclear weapons is claimed to be "tantamount to recognizing that
such weapons may be used in certain circumstances.'" This inference
must be rejected. This logic advanced by nuclear weapon states is clearly
based on a misconceived position of non-nuclear weapon states and of the
aims of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation. Nuclear weapons have never been
"accepted." The Treaty of Non Proliferation was based on a pragmatic
observation of fact: the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
Treaty's purpose was only to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons.
However, the Treaty's eventual aim was "[t]he cessation of the manufacture
of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing . . . stockpiles and the
elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery." 161 The Treaty should not be interpreted as an acceptance of the
possession, threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Treaty should be
interpreted as the first step toward the eventual abolition of nuclear
weapons.' 62
c. Customary Prohibition
Development of custom as a source of law requires the fulfillment of a
double requirement, a constant state practice and an opinio juris. Some
states argued that those requirements were met with respect to the legality
or threat of nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons have not been utilized
since 1945. However, other states argued that non-utilization since 1945
failed to ratify the constant practice and opino juris requirements because
circumstances justifying the use of nuclear weapons had not arisen since
160 Id. at 246.
161 See Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
162 See Zarif, supra note 64, at 14.
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1945.163 The Court held that the profound division in the international
community showed that no opinio juris existed and thus that no customary
rule explicitly prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons had emerged.'6
The conclusion of the Court that the divided views of the members of the
international community stood in the way of an evolution in customary law
on the subject of legality or illegality of recourse to nuclear weapons is
correct. It is therefore of the utmost importance to assess the situation before
the creation of this status quo. In other words, was there at the beginning
of the nuclear age a rule of international law prohibiting states "from
creating effects of the kind which would later be produced by the use of
nuclear weapons?"'' 65 In our view, jus in bello, especially humanitarian
law, contains such rules. These pre-existing rules are reflected in the various
resolutions of the General Assembly denouncing recourse to nuclear
weapons. The same rules also find an expression in the above mentioned
treaties dealing with nuclear weapons expressis verbis. The fact that the
resolutions are not binding or occasioned negative votes is immaterial to the
existence of these rules.
The Court did not concur with this view. It does not refute the existence
of pre-existing rules. It merely states that a resolution can provide evidence
for establishing the existence of a rule (or the emergence of an opiniojuris).
Such a resolution has a normative character, which is deduced from its
content, the conditions of its adoption and the existence of an opiniojuris as
to its normative character. 66  As to the content of the resolutions, the
Court makes a gross generalization. It states that the resolutions put before
the Court "declare that the use of nuclear weapons would be a direct
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and in certain formulations
that such use 'should be prohibited'.' 67  It should be noted that the
formulation in the resolutions varies, but these resolutions are based on a
161 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 254.
,6 See also Millet, supra note 76, at 165-66.
165 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 380 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
'66 For background on the normative character of General Assembly resolutions see
Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782-91 (1960); JORGE CASTAIEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS (1969); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Barbara Sloan, General
Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 41-150 (1987).
167 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 255.
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clear position taken by the General Assembly in the primary resolution on
the subject, namely Resolution 1653 (XVI) of November 24, 1961. ' s As
observed by the Court, this resolution expressly proclaims the illegality of
recourse to nuclear weapons. 69 As the Court points out, this resolution
does not give a specific customary rule prohibiting nuclear weapons, but it
qualifies the legal nature of nuclear weapons. 7' The Court continues by
saying that the resolution only performs this exercise in legal reasoning in
the absence of a specific customary rule prohibiting the threat or use of
nuclear weapons."' This is hardly surprising since the Court established
that no rule of customary international law could have developed because no
opinio juris could be formed due to the division of the international
community on this point.'72 The only rule of customary international law
that could exist is a pre-atomic age rule dealing with the consequences
created by the use of nuclear weapons. Such a rule could not have been
rescinded. There was neither an opinio juris present to create new rules nor
an opinio juris present to rescind existing rules.
A limited number of negative votes and abstentions on resolutions cannot
diminish the value of these pre-existing rules contained in these resolutions.
Consequently, the Court could have held that customary rules exist that
prohibit the use of any weapons with effects similar to those of nuclear
weapons.
2. International Humanitarian Law
After concluding that no conventional rule of general scope, nor a
customary rule, could be found specifically prohibiting the threat or use of
nuclear weapons per se, the Court turned to the question of whether the rules
and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict
and the law of neutrality would allow the use of nuclear weapons. Since
ancient times, rules have been adopted on the manner in which one was
allowed to conduct hostilities. In India, China, Ancient Rome and the
'68 For a list of these resolutions, see Jill Sheldon, Note, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws
of War, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 181, 230 (1996).
169 id.
o70 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 255.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 254.
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European Middle Ages, rules governing the conduct of war existed. 173
These rules have since inspired the creation of a large number of customary
rules. 7 4 To deduce whether the use of nuclear weapons would violate that
body of customary law, the Court reviewed the historical sources of "the
laws and customs of war."' 17  During their review of these sources, the
Court sanctioned the marriage of the Hague law and Geneva law, two bodies
of law that together comprise international humanitarian law. 176  This
corpus of law must be "observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them" because "the great majority of
[humanitarian law] had already become customary" when the conventions
were ratified. 77  The Court notes that "[t]he extensive codification of
humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the resultant treaties, as
well as the fact that the denunciation clauses that existed in the codification
instruments have never been used," have created "a corpus of treaty rules,
the great majority of which" pertains to the domain of customary law.17 8
States are thus bound by these rules irrespective of the fact that they have
ratified the conventions in which the rules are enunciated. In addition, these
rules of humanitarian law have been widely supported by the international
community.
Admittedly, the rules on humanitarian law were accepted prior to the
development of nuclear weapons, and the conferences of 1949 and 1971-
1977 did not expressly refer to nuclear weapons. 79 Moreover no one will
doubt that the character of nuclear weapons compared to "conventional"
weapons makes them different from any existing type of weapon. Despite
the lack of reference to nuclear weapons in existing humanitarian law, the
Court finds that the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflicts apply also to nuclear weapons, and concludes that the
opposite view "would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian
'" For example, in a passage in the Seventh Book of Manu, the legendary Hindu lawgiver
states that "when the king fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons
concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned, of the points of which are blazing
with fire," which is a demonstration of an ancient civilizations rules which had to be
respected during armed conflicts. Weiss, supra note 81, at 739.
74 There was a similar development in the jus ad bellum.
175 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 256.
176 id.
' Id. at 258.
178 id.
171 See supra p. 370.
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character of the legal principles in question which permeates the entire law
of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and all kinds of
weapons."' 80 The continued reaffirmation of the Martens clause confirms
the correctness of the Court's reasoning. Using this same reasoning, the
Court could easily counter the argument that Additional Protocol I of 1977
would not be applicable to nuclear weapons because the nuclear issue was
not the object of the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of
Additional Protocol IV181 Since Additional Protocol I codifies pre-existing
rules of customary law, these rules are applicable irrespective of whether the
substantive issue of this Protocol dealt with nuclear weapons. It is
significant that the vast majority of states have contended that the rules of
humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons. 82
The Court even associated these rules of humanitarian law with something
close to the concept of jus cogens. In fact, the solemn language used in
paragraph 79 of the opinion to describe these rules alludes to jus cogens. s3
's Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 259.
I Id. at 259. On signing the Additional Protocol, all the great powers, save China, made
a declaration whereby the new rules introduced by the Additional Protocol were not meant
to affect, regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. France did not sign the Protocol,
but commented at the end of the Conference that "the rules of the Protocol do not apply to
the use of nuclear weapons." See Hearn, supra note 158, at 241; Henri Meyrowitz, Les armes
nucleaires et le droit de la guerre in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CoNFucr:
CHALLENGES AHEAD 297, 312-14 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerad J. Tanja eds., 1991). In
addition, the Conference itself could only be brought to an end if the question of nuclear
weapons was left outside the discussion. Frits Kalshoven wrote that "the choice has been
clear throughout the proceedings of the Diplomatic Conference: it was either a Protocol not
bearing on the use of nuclear weapons, or no Protocol at all." Frits Kalshoven, Arms,
Armaments and International Law, 191 RECEUIL DES COURS DE L'ACADmtE DE DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 187, 283 (1985).
382 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 259. Similarly,
Meyrowitz pointed out that no nuclear power has ever pretended, can or would pretend that
the customary rules are not applicable to nuclear weapons. Meyrowitz, supra note 181, at
314.
183 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 257. See also
L. Condorelli, Nuclear weapons: A Weighty Matter for the International Court of Justice,
INT'L REV RED CROSS 17 (1997) (stating that "the solemn tone of the phrase, and its
wording, show that the Court intended to declare something much more incisive and
significant, doubtless in order to bring the fundamental rules so described closer tojus cogens;
to bring them closer but not make them part of it, for in paragraph 83 the Court says frankly
that it does not feel it has to decide whether these are peremptory rules-a statement open
to question for many reasons.").
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The court describes the rules as "fundamental to the respect of the human
person and 'elementary considerations of humanity' " and "intransgressible
principles of international customary law."'8'
The court singled out five fundamental principles of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict for further discussion.'85  These are: the
principle of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, the
prohibition regarding use of indiscriminate weapons, the prohibition
regarding use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or that aggravate
suffering (principle of humanity), the principle limiting the means to wage
war, and the prohibition regarding use of weapons that violate the neutrality
of non-participating states.
18 6
The principle of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants
In the view of the Court, the first principle is "aimed at the protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects."' ' It therefore makes a distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. The Court confirms the value of
this customary rule that has been the object of various instruments including
Article 25 and 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1907,188 General Assembly
resolution 2444 (XXIII) of December 18, 1968,189 and Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I of 1977.' 90 The importance of the Court's reaffirma-
tion of this principle lies in the difficulty of distinguishing between
combatants and non-combatants. Some scholars claim that it is impossible
to keep straight the traditional distinction between combatants and non-
combatants.' 9' For example, Schwarzenberger has pointed out that the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is not limited to
"soldiers in the field" but is connected to anyone contributing to the war




'SS Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
reprinted in THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (J.B. Scott
ed., 3d ed. 1918).
89 Resolution 2444 (XXIII) proclaims that "a distinction must be made at all times
between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the
effect that the latter be spared as much as possible." Hearn supra note 157, at 235.
190 Protocol I, supra note 106.
191 See Falk, supra note 69, at 565.
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effort.'92 Likewise, Hearn has concluded that the rule is vague and
somewhat subjective, requiring a balance of the considerations of military
necessity and humanity. 93
The prohibition regarding the use of indiscriminate weapons
According to the Court, "States must never make civilians the object of
attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets."' ' This rule is similar
to that enunciated in Article 51 paragraphs 4 and 5 of Additional Protocol
I. It was important that the Court confirmed the customary value of the rule
because only one instrument expresses this rule and Additional Protocol I has
not been ratified by all states. 95 Yet it is not clear what the Court meant
by "incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets" since
most of the Court's judges had opposing views on the issue of whether the
use of nuclear weapons would have indiscriminate effect.1
96
192 See Hearn, supra note 157, at 236.
193 Id. at 235-36.
194 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 257.
195 See L. Doswald-Beck, International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of
the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 38-39 (1997).
"9 The majority found that nuclear weapons have an indiscriminate effect. President
Bedjaoui pointed out that "[Iles armes nucleaires paraissent bien -du moins dans l'dtat actuel
de la science-de nature b faire des victimes indiscrimines, confondant combatants et non-
combatants et causent de surcroit des souffrances inutiles aux uns comme aux autres. L'arme
nucliaire, arne aveugle, ddstabilise donc par nature le droit humanitaire, droit du
discernement dans l'utilisation des armes." The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 1, at 272 (declaration of President Bedjaoui). Judge Herczegh declared
that "[Iles principes fondamentaux du droit international humanitaire, correctement mis en
valeur dans les motifs de l'avis consultatif, interdisent d'une mani6re catgorique et sans
6quivoque l'emploi des armes de destruction massive et, parmi celles-ci, des armes
nucleaires." Id. at 275 (declaration of Judge Herczegh). In the view of Judge Fleischhauer
"[t]he nuclear weapon is, in many ways, the negation of the humanitarian considerations
underlying the law applicable in armed conflict and of the principle of neutrality. The nuclear
weapon cannot distinguish between civilian and military targets." Id. at 306 (separate opinion
of Judge Fleischhauer).
Other judges shared the view that the use of nuclear weapons would not necessarily be
indiscriminate. Judge Guillaume believed that "le droit coutumier humanitaire comporte une
seule interdiction absolue: celle des armes dites "aveugles" qui sont dans l'incapacitd de
distinguer entre cibles civiles et cibles militaires. Mais A l'6vidence les armes nucl~aires
n'entrent pas n6cdssairement dans cette cat~gorie." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
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The prohibition regarding use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering
or aggravate suffering
In the words of the Court, "weapons causing [unnecessary] harm or uselessly
aggravating ... suffering" are prohibited. 97 The Court's attention to this
principle is meritorious of the advisory opinion. 9' Yet some doctrinal
controversies were not solved. For example, the Court failed to provide a
standard for assessing whether the use of a weapon is causing unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury.'"
The principle limiting the means to wage war
The Court referred to the Martens Clause2" as an "effective means of
addressing the rapid evolution of military technology."' ' This clause first
appeared (or, was first approved) in the 1899 Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899 Hague II) and was reaffirmed by
the similarly titled, and virtually identical, Convention of 1907 (Hague
IV). 20 2 Modem-day references to this clause are numerous. 20 3 The Court
Weapons, supra note 1, at 289 (Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume). Vice President
Schwebel pointed out that "[wihile it is not difficult to conclude that the principle of
international humanitarian law-above all [... ] discrimination between military and civilian
targets--govern the use of nuclear weapons, it does not follow that the application of those
principles to the threat or use of nuclear weapons' in any circumstance is easy." Id. at 320
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel). Finally Judge Higgins mentioned that "[n]otwith-
standing the unique and profoundly destructive characteristics of all nuclear weapons, that
very term covers a variety of weapons which are not monolithic in all their effect. To the
extent that a specific nuclear weapon would be incapable of this distinction, its use would be
unlawful." Id. at 589 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins).
'9 Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 257.
'g
8 See Doswald-Beck, supra note 195, at 45 (noting that the international community has
in recent times paid little attention to this principle).
199 Id. at 45-46.
o The text of the Martens Clause in the Hague Convention IV reads as follows:
Until a more complete code of the law of war has been issued, the High Contracting
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of
the public conscience.
Convention (IV) supra note 113.
20 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 257.
202 Weiss, supra note 86, at 741.
203 See id. at 742 (for a list of these references).
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considers Article 1, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, a modem version of the clause.2' This provision
proclaims that: "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other interna-
tional agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience."2 5
The prohibition regarding use of weapons that violate the neutrality of non-
participating states
Turning to the question of neutrality, the Court referred to the proceedings
of the WHO request, 2°6 in which a state described the principle of neutrali-
ty. 207 The Court decided that the principle of neutrality was relevant to its
inquiry and then stated: "as in the case of the principles of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the
principle of neutrality, whatever its content, which is of fundamental
character similar to that of the humanitarian principles and rules, is
applicable (subject to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter),
to all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be
used. , 208
In concluding that the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable
in armed conflicts as well as the rules on neutrality are relevant to the
question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court
established the standards to which a state's use of nuclear weapons must
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 257.
205 Protocol I, supra note 106.
206 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 260-61.
207 The principle of neutrality, in its classic sense, was aimed at preventing the incursion
of belligerent forces into neutral territory, or attacks on the persons or ships of neutrals.
Thus: 1) "the territory of neutral powers is inviolable." Hague Convention (V) Respecting
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 1; 2) "belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers.. ." Hague
Convention (XIII) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct.
18, 1907, art. 1; 3) "neutral states have equal interest in having their rights respected by
belligerents...", Convention on Marine Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928. Clearly, the "principle
of neutrality applies with equal force to transborder incursions of armed forces and to the
transborder damage caused to a neutral state by the use of a weapon in a belligerent State."
Id.
20 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 261.
[Vol. 27:345
THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
conform.209 As one state expressed it in the proceedings: "[a]ssuming that
a State's use of nuclear weapons meets the requirements of self-defense, it
must be considered whether it conforms to the fundamental principles of the
law of armed conflict regulating the conduct of hostilities."2 1
Although agreement on the applicable law was easily reached, the
conclusions to be drawn from this body of law are, according to the Court,
controversial. 1 Some states argue that "nuclear weapons might be used
in a wide variety of cases, with very different results in terms of likely
civilian casualties" 212 and thereby suggest that the use of low yield nuclear
weapons against military targets situated in sparsely populated areas would
conform to the requirements of the rules and principles of humanitarian
law.2" 3 Conversely, other states argue that "recourse to nuclear weapons
could never be compatible with the principles and rules of humanitarian
law., 214 They argue that the use of nuclear weapons would "in all circum-
stances be unable to draw any distinction between the civilian population and
combatants, or between civilian objects and military objectives."2 5 They
argue further that the effects are largely uncontrollable and could not be
contained to military targets alone. 6 Therefore, these weapons would
"kill and destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate manner, on account of the
blast, heat and radiation occasioned by the nuclear explosion and the effects
induced., 21 7  The same arguments were defended on the question of
neutrality.
The Court is very reluctant to take a position. As stated earlier, the Court
decided that it has insufficient basis for determining the validity of the view
that the careful use of smaller, low yield tactical nuclear weapons would be
justified under humanitarian law.2 t8 Nor can it determine whether such
limited use "would not tend to escalate into the all-use of high yield nuclear
209 See id.
210 Id. (quoting Written Statement of the United Kingdom).
2-1 See id.
212 id.
23 See id. at 261-62 (quoting Written Statement of the United Kingdom; Oral Statement
of the United States of America).
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weapons. 2 19
The Court turned to the core of the advisory opinion. Here again, the
Court demonstrated its hesitation. Referring to the standards of humanitarian
law it had established before, the Court reaffirmed that "methods and means
of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and
military targets, or which would preclude any distinction between civilian
and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to
combatants are prohibited.' 20 Thus, "in view of the unique characteristics
of nuclear weapons," the Court deems "the use of such weapons ... scarcely
reconcilable with respect for such requirements. 221  And yet, the Court
states it does not possess sufficient evidence "to conclude with certainty that
the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circum-
stance. ' 2 2 The reasons for this non liquet have to be deduced from the
"fundamental right of every state to survival' 223 and the policy of deter-
rence, "to which an appreciable section of the international community
adhered for many years. ' '224
Instead of leaving the issue open, the Court should have given a
conclusive answer. We are confronted here with rules and principles deemed
fundamental for the community of states. However, when the Court, the
principal judicial organ of the world organization, is confronted with one of
the most dangerous threats to the world community, it cannot find an answer
to the question whether these threats would violate international law. The
Court recognizes a great corpus of international law which might be
appropriate. 2' 5 The Court has even isolated relevant rules and principles,
but the Court refused to apply them to this particular situation.226 When
the survival of a state is at stake, would a user of nuclear weapons be
capable of distinguishing between civilian and military objects? Are the
rules of neutrality and the environmental rules weakened in their application
when the survival of the state is a risk?
Moreover, the Court has created a new category of acceptable behavior by
219 Id.
" Id. (emphasis added).
221 id.
222 Id.
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allowing self-defense if the survival of the state is in peril. The Court
seemed to accept the doctrine of "military necessity" common in certain
military circles but repudiated under the law.227 This is not only judicial
legislation, but also contrary to the raison d'9tre of the rules outlawing
aggression. Indeed, the Charter of the United Nations has, in Article 2(4),
prohibited any threat or use of force contrary to the purposes of the United
Nations.228 Article 51 protects states which are the object of aggression by
allowing them a right to defend themselves. Consequently, the Court did not
need to create a new category, or an exception to the rule, because the
concept of self-defense includes the possibility of using force against
aggression, including situations in which the state's survival would be at risk.
Since this right of self-defense is conditional, all self-defense initiatives must
comply with these rules.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Advisory Opinion rendered on the request of the General Assembly
regarding the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has taken a cautious approach. Too cautious, some
might say. The present Court is quite conservative in its judgments and
opinions. A more progressive Court, like the Court of the 1980s, might have
answered the question differently.
One thing is certain, the Court's conclusion is curious. First, it reduced
the scope of conventional law to that applicable in armed conflict, followed
by an examination of the jus at bellum and jus in bello. The Court began
by examining the UN Charter provisions on self-defense. It concluded that
there were no specific rules prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Then
it established the foundations of humanitarian law. First, the civilian
population and objects are protected. Second, unnecessary suffering to
227 On the illegality of the doctrine of "necessity," Meyrowitz writes that "[m]algrd
1'6norme diff6rence qui existe au point de vue quantitatif et qualitatif entre les armes
nuclaires et les armes classiques, et entre la nature, les effets, et les cons&luences des effets,
d'une guerre nucltaire et ceux d'une guerre classique, on ne voit pas en quoi l'introduction
des armes atomiques aurait modifi6 les 616ments du probl~me juridique de l'6tat de n6cessit6.
Les situations de ndcessit6 extreme, c'est-t-dire de pdril non seulement de la dtfaite, mais de
subjugation (debellatio) ont toujours fait partie integrate du phdnomne et de la notion de
guerre. Et tout comme elle est un 616ment logique de la notion de guerre, la ddfaite est aussi
un 616ment logique, prtsupposd, du droit de la guerre." Meyrowitz, supra note 180, at 322.
221 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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combatants is proscribed. Third, states not participating in the conflict are
protected by the principle of neutrality. After setting the standards, the Court
properly examined whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
violate these standards. With a deciding vote of the President, the Court
concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, the Court
did not conclude definitively whether use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the
very survival of a State would be at stake. Of course, a dilemma emerges
when one is forced to choose between extreme self-defense and the rules and
principles of humanitarian law. But should the Court necessarily choose
self-defense over humanitarian law, environmental law and human rights
law?
Despite its problems, the advisory opinion has the merit of clarifying some
points. First, nuclear weapons, everyone agrees, are reprehensible. The
opinion confirms that states possessing nuclear weapons are under a duty to
disarm. Second, although paragraph 2 E remains controversial, the Court did
not give license to states to use nuclear weapons in the extreme circumstanc-
es of self-defense, it merely refused to decide the question. The Court's
opinion makes clear that, generally, nuclear weapons cannot be employed in
conformity with the rules of international humanitarian law. It is, moreover,
hard to conceive situations where nuclear weapons could be used without
violating environmental law. In any case, even in extreme situations, the use
or threat of nuclear weapons is subject to law established in the UN Charter
and in humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. The importance of
the present opinion is that it established customary rules of humanitarian law
applicable to any present and future weapon.
However, the Court should not be given much praise for the opinion. The
Court did not give a straight answer to the question submitted but instead
dodged the question by rendering unclear and contradictory advice. The root
of the problem seems to lie in disagreements on the philosophical basis of
the concept of self-defense. Under a modem view of international law, self-
defense is a legal concept subject to regulation. The difficulty seems to lie
in the conflict between two sets of legal rules. On the one hand, the
concept of self-defense (or to be more precise, the extreme situation of self-
defense where the existence of the state is threatened) and, on the other
hand, the rules of international humanitarian law safeguarding life and the
well-being of the human race.
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The Court should have distinguished the objectives of the United Nations
from the methods to reach these objectives. In other words, the Court should
have distinguished the ends from the means. The aim of the United Nations
is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, . . . and to
reaffirm the faith in fundamental human dignity and worth of the human
person.229 The rules that are most adequate to achieve this goal are
undoubtedly the rules of humanitarian law, rather than the concept of
extreme self-defense. States are only means of governing communities of
peoples and facilitating the interaction between those communities and are
never an end in themselves. The Court should have given priority to the
objective of the international community instead of favoring the survival of
states.
229 UN Charter
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